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Introduction 
A fu-!1damental shift for preparing the entry into a new, militarily 
relevant big technology is currently taking place in West Germany. This 
technology - its proponents maintain - can be compared in terms of 
its dimensions, costs, and social consequences with nuclear energy. I am 
referring to West Germany's plans for manned space flight, which have 
been outlined by a number of decisions during 1985 and 1986; they 
will eventually lead to anational space program and thus to a funda-
mental reorganization of research priorities. While it is still impossible 
to predict the outcome of these ongoing processes, we have the chance 
of observing the emergence of a new big technology out of a specific 
area of social, political, economic, and military interests; we can also 
observe the actions of those interest-groups, which begin to form a 
stable pattern of argumentation and legitimation, thus producing, step 
by step, a self-consolidating social structure with its own interests and 
its own dynamics. 
The space lobby, however, doesn't start from zero; a system (in 
terms of social force and the power to determine research policy) to 
some extent comparable to the U.S. military-industrial complex has 
been established during the last thirty years. It possesses an inner 
coherence and institutional resistance. The development of this com-
plex is one important point this paper will examine. German plans for 
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manned space flight can be regarded to some extent as a continuation 
of (nuclear) high-tech policy in another field - that is, as a sort of 
follow-up technology for the defense-nuclear-space complex (1). 
In addition, there is a political continuity, for space technology is 
viewed by many space-Iobbyists as a unique chance for West Germany 
to catch up with the military superpowers again by participation in the 
postnuclear arms race. Space plans entail a continuity and at the same 
time a new quality of West German foreign, defense, and research 
policy. The frequent publicly pronounced reflections about a "Euro-
pean space-power" (Helmut Ulke, in Stellungnahmen, p. 7) und er West 
German "system-leaders hip" (DGAP 1986:49), with well-known and 
openly discussed military consequences (2), indicate a new determina-
tion of the military-industrial complex, no longer to restrict itself to the 
development of civilian technologies (which was the trademark of West 
German research policy up to now [see Haunschild 1986:61]), but to 
insist on the interchangeability of civilian and military technologies, 
thus opening a wide field of common activities for science, industry, 
and the military. 
This paper will first take a look back at the his tory of German space 
flight from the 1930s up to 1987 (section I), thus providing background 
information to help us to understand the processes that brought ab out 
the recent space plans and the groups involved in the game. These 
groups and their specific interests and argumentation strategies will be 
examined in a second step (section II), which will also show the 
mechanism that brings these different groups together and ties them up 
into a self-consolidating new social structure. Section III will describe 
and analyze the political program of the space lobby and discuss the 
financial and social costs that will emerge from it. The manner in which 
the space lobby deals with these problems which emerge when it 
confronts the public and the legitimation strategies used in these public 
debates form a distinct part of the identity of the space lobby and can 
be analyzed as a sort of system-environment relation that defines the 
borders of the structure and provides it with legitimacy. Those pro-
cesses are analyzed in section IV, which also will discuss the relation-
ship between civilian and military space flight. The final section tries 
to integrate the argumentation lines of the previous sections and to 
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elaborate on some aspects of a sociological approach that serves as a 
(mostly implicit) analytical framework. 
I. A Short History of German Space Flight 
In order to understand the present situation in West German space 
discussions we need to look back briefly at its history, concentrating on 
manned space flight. (For illustration, see figure 1.) Though the early 
pioneers in the 1920s and 1930s often dreamed of man on the mo on, 
the first institutionalization of space activities took place under military 
sponsorship during the Nazi era. As early as 1932 the Heereswaf-
fenamt (Army Ordnance Department) - "naturally" interested in 
ballistic missiles of any kind - started support for the Nebel-Braun 
Group, and it installed one of the first (the world's first?) "Big Science" 
laboratories in Peenemunde in 1937. On the other hand, the Luftwaffe 
(Air Force) - "naturally" more interested in any sort of plane-like 
object - not only supported the construction of the cruise missile 
called V-I, but starting in 1937 it also gave Eugen Saenger the chance 
to construct new rocket engines as weIl as to design his antipodal space 
bomber, an aircraft similar to the U.S. space shuttle. Just as in the case 
of the Manhattan Project, in 1942 the command was given to start the 
mass production of A-4 missiles parallel to the research work still to be 
done. And in 1944, when the first military version was operational, the 
A-4 was renamed "Vergeltungswaffe" V-2 (retaliatory weapon) (3). 
In 1945 space science, along with military R&D, was abolished in 
Germany, but research and construction went on in the United States, 
where Wernher von Braun and his team further developed the A-4N-2 
and finally, many years later, constructed the Saturn rocket. The 
Saenger shuttle disappeared in the files for a while until its revival in 
1964. The German aerospace researchers spent the ten years that were 
to pass before military, nuclear, aeronautics, and space research were 
permitted again, in different fields. Some went abroad - for example, 
to Argentina - to continue research (4), or they worked on joint 
projects - for example, with France (Büdeler 1978:79). The Dornier 
company switched over to textile-machine building until they were 
allowed to continue their aerospace work (Büdeler 1978:109). Ludwig 
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248 Johannes Weyer 
Bölkow, the famous aircraft designer, worked for ten years "out of his 
branch" (Büdeler 1982:71) but reentered aeronautics in 1954 (in the 
fields of sports planes and helicopters); in 1956, however, he switched 
back to his original profession and started to construct rocket engines 
again. This was supported by research contracts from the newly estab-
lished Department of Defense and the Ministry of Education and 
Science (Büdeler 1982:74). The Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft 
(German Research Council) also started its support for space research 
during this period. 
With this recognition of space research, including rocket research, 
and with the beginning of public funding, the era of illegality and of 
relabeling and sidestepping was definitely over. But another six years 
would have to pass before space research became an issue for the 
government - largely due to proposals of European space scientists to 
establish a European organization for space research, which would 
include West Germany. The Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft was 
asked by the government in 1960 to put forth proposals for German 
space activities. This led to German participation in the foundation of 
the two European space organizations ELDO (European Launcher 
Development Organization) and ESRO (European Space Research 
Organization) and to the institutionalization of a department of space 
research within the Ministry for Nuclear Questions in 1962, which, 
among other things, can be held responsible for the expansion of that 
ministry to the Ministry for Scientific Research in 1962 (see Stamm 
1981:229-230). From 1967 a special space program has been worked 
out, usually covering aperiod of about four years. 
The 1960s can be regarded as the phase of reentry into the field. 
German space policy was concentrated on catching up with the com-
petition - building up aspace infrastructure and exploring the niches 
in the field left to the late-comer. This was achieved when the first 
German satellite went into space and at the same time the research 
capacities were concentrated in the Deutsche Forschungs- und Ver-
suchsanstalt für Luft- und Raumfahrt (DFVLR); the coincidence of 
both occurrences in 1969 was probably accidental. During this phase 
some very important decisions were made. One affected the pursuit of 
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the more traditional space sciences (those looking up to the stars and 
exploring the nature of space) and simultaneously the applied space 
sciences, above all rocket engineering; this was a distinct reorienta-
tion of the fields of space science. Another decision was of similar 
relevance: To accept the invitation to participate in joint European 
endeavors, but at the same time to start anational space program and 
different forms of bilateral cooperation (which are naturally less con-
trollable). From the very first, Germany tried to make its space policy 
independent by way of commitments in different contexts. As figure 1 
shows, these decisions in the early 1960s make present politics more 
understandable. 
The American and the European connections were both very promi-
nent for the promotion of different lines of technological development 
and for providing the frame of reference for a gradual selection from 
the widespread range of alternatives generated by space scientists. 
There was a host of sometimes incredible proposals generated in this 
utopian stage, in which German scientists and aerospace companies 
could do hardly more than dose the gap to competitors, while at the 
same time preparing ideas for the future. Some of those ideas fitted into 
the existing framework. For example, Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm 
(MBB) began in 1961 to design a high-energetic rocket engine (a partly 
military, partly European-civilian project), which is still used in the U.S. 
space shuttle (and is well paid) (Büdeler 1982:74-75). Project N eptun 
- a gigantic rocket, designed to operate in the post-Saturn age - never 
left the drawing boards in Berlin (5); the idea of achieving a European 
autonomy by constructing such a vehide was simply too futuristic. But 
the plans for the Saenger space shuttle - which was redesigned in 1964 
by Junkers (today MBB), and submitted in 1965 as a proposal for 
German-American cooperation (Büdeler 1978:40; Büdeler 1968:218, 
236; Büdeler 1979:463) - and the participation of the aerospace 
company ERNO (Entwicklungring Nord) in the preshuttle program by 
designing and testing the shuttle "Bumerang" in the late 1960s (6), 
indicate that some of the concepts (based on specific German research 
traditions) were not entirely unrealistic. 
Though Germany owed a lot to the United States because of the 
generous transfer of know-how and the free disposal of launching 
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facilities (see Keppler 1986:532-533, Büdeler 1968:239-246), it was 
not willing to become a subcontractor in the V.S. post-Apollo program. 
Simultaneously with the U.S. offer for participation in this program, the 
Europeans were forced to think about the future of their own space 
program, since the rocket Europe turned out to be a flop and the 
conditions under which U.S. launehing facilities could be used and the 
style of behavior became increasingly unfavorable (see, e.g., Büdeler 
1979:371). 
Decisions taken in 1972 mark the beginning of another stage in 
German space policy. They were: 
to launch the Ariane rocket program (a French proposal); 
to reorganize European space policy (which resulted in the 
foundation ofthe European Space Agency [ESA] in 1975); and 
to contribute to the V.S. post-Apollo program (the shuttle pro-
gram, also settled in 1972) with the Spacelab, thereby occupying 
a niche in the program (see Köhler 1976:78). 
With Spacelab, plans for a European shuttle were dropped, but the 
entry to manned space flight was programed. Applied space sciences 
and space engineering were given a higher priority than before. At the 
same time, Germany strengthened its position within ESA, because 
Spacelab was constructed under German leadership (and more than 
half of the costs were paid by Germany) (see DFVLR 1984:169). The 
ESA program was given a specific shape, consisting of the French-
dominated Ariane program, which led to a breakthrough in the field of 
launchers and a commercialization of the satellite market, and the 
German-dominated Spacelab program, leading to future scenarios of 
manned space flight and other, unforeseeable, applications. Spacelab 
flew in 1983, but the investments were lost - in that Spacelab now is 
the property of NASA, and Europe has no access to this field except by 
using the shuttle every two or three years (e.g., the D-1 mission). 
Ariane, on the other hand, flew in 1981 and established asolid 
corners tone of the so-called European autonomy in space. 
The 1970s can be regarded as a stage in which Germany caught up 
with her competitors by means of different forms of co operation and 
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slowly started to stake her own claims in the field, while exerclsmg 
influence on ESA politics in a way that led to European-American 
cooperation and to manned space flight. German scientists gained 
know-how in nearly every field and achieved a top position in some 
areas (satellite propulsion, space physiology, some fields of remote 
sensing). Not least important, the German organizational framework 
was reconstructed as concentration processes in industry Ieft only 
two big high-tech aeronautics-aerospace-military trusts: Messerschmitt-
Bölkow-Blohm and Dornier (nowadays, Daimler-MTU-AEG-Dornier). 
The forfeited investments in Spacelab are regarded by members of the 
space lobby as worthwhile because of that program's catching-up 
function (7). 
The next stage, starting in 1984, shows a new style: that of a self-
conscious German space policy, which is becoming more and more part 
of an integral political concept. This is now outlined by some think-
tanks, which openly discuss plans for a future German superpower 
(based on space weapons) and sometimes do not hide their national-
istic, militaristic, and imperialistic attitudes toward the "high frontier" 
(8). Even if official statements of the government are much more 
moderate, the concepts of the space lobby are nevertheless compatible 
with the new politics carried out under the label "autonomy" - that is, 
Germany is no longer content with its roIe as a co-player but claims 
leaders hip in European space politics. This trend even allows discus-
sion of the military applications of space technology now available (or 
under construction) in the German or the ESA arsenal. One essential 
factor of these plans is the pursuit of an independent European access 
to manned space flight within the next decade - even if a tactical 
co operation with the U.S. space-station program is still in the game (9). 
The main steps were taken in 1984 when President Reagan invited 
the Europeans to participate in the project of aspace station and thus 
exerted decisive pressure on them. In 1984, too, the Western European 
Union (WEU), a defense alliance, discussed plans for a space-based 
European Defense Initiative, which would use such ESA technologies 
as, for example, the weather satellite Meteosat. And in 1985 ESA set 
up a new program containing the new rocket Ariane V and the Euro-
pean contribution to the U.S. space station called Columbus. 
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This short presentation of the history of German space flight can be 
divided, as we have seen, into three stages: 
(i) 1961-1972: Reentry into the field, construction of the infra-
structure for space research. 
(ii) 1972-1984: Catching up with competitors, different forms of 
cooperation. 
(iii) since 1984: Claim to a leading role, entry to manned space 
flight, trend toward a militarization of space flight. 
This his tory also shows that there have always been different lines of 
technological development that were selected by political decisions. For 
example, the German shuttle Saenger has been in the game as one 
potential option for the last fifty years, and yet it has never been 
constructed (see figure 1). The development decisions were affected by 
the political and economical frame of reference, policy and research 
traditions, and different sets of interests. 
I will attempt here to analyze the various interest-groups and the way 
in which they formed, step by step, an interest-alliance to realize the 
technology of manned space flight. Only an analysis of this kind can tell 
us why the development, presented above, proceeded in such a straight-
forward manner and how the space lobby could gain so much strength 
that is is now in a position to define the future of the nation as 
dependent on space flight (in much the same way as the nuclear lobby, 
in recent decades). 
11. Constructing Coherence: Interest-Groups in the Space Arena 
We can clearly identify four social groups in the space scene, some 
centers of reference in the environment, and a type of irreversible 
his tory characterized - as shown above - by a number of decisions 
made in the past, a specific tradition, and political inertia (for illustra-
tion, see figure 2). My main thesis is: The mechanism producing a novel 
social structure with a certain type of internal coherence can be defined 
by processes of adjustment of interests and transformation of argu-
ments. Thus, different actors acting in formerly rather independent 
fields strengthen their own position inside those fields because they 
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254 Johannes Weyer 
become able to import credibility from outside. These processes of 
mutual reinforcement, which build up hybrid or intermediate structures, 
subsequently lead to a restructuring of those fields in a way that can be 
described as a shift in the balance of power (10). 
Science 
Besides the traditional forms of space science, like astronomy, rocket 
engineering was established as a systematic purpose in the early 
twentieth century, and was pushed forward when the German military 
perceived the implications of that technology for revolutionizing war-
fare. The technicalization of traditional space sciences by the applica-
tion of modern rockets (11) allowed the scientists in a first phase to 
complete their research and to solve puzzles that were unsolvable by 
terrestrial technology - in a way, to pursue their research paradigm 
and to achieve some revolutionary discoveries (see Keppler 1986:532). 
But the constant technicalization of space projects, which was addi-
tionally reinforced by manned space flight, on the one hand, and a sort 
of dynamics of space flight on the other, led to a remarkable paradigm-
shift in space sciences due to the fact that, if transported into space, 
instruments and telescopes could be turned around to look back at the 
earth. Earth remote sensing came into being as a field of (largely 
military) interest. The main shift occurred when space exploration was 
gradually replaced by research in space and research on problems of 
manned space flight (see Feuerbacher 1984:53, and Köhler 1976). This 
step was carried out in Germany by the Spacelab program. 
The scientists concerned with the more traditional fields, which 
earlier had profited from unmanned space flight, now complain about 
space politics and the neglect of their concerns. They have only a few 
arguments left (mostly the general cultural benefits of science and the 
technological spin-off from utopian scientific programs [see Keppler 
1986]). They have no allies in other fields, and the gradual displace-
ment of scientific organizations from the decision-making process is 
obvious. In 1960 the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft still outlined 
the German space program (see Gambke, Kerscher, and Kertz 1961); 
but with the constantly increasing dominance of the space industry and 
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applied science and engineering, the traditional scientific organizations 
(representing the academic branches) have lost their influence. In 1984 
the main organizations wrote a letter to the research minister protesting 
the funding of Columbus out of the research budget (12), which was 
combined with the cancellation of some basic research projects (e.g., 
the German infrared telescope GIRL) - but they could not exercise 
any influence. The c1assical space sciences are reduced to a marginal 
position in the field, and former outsiders, who are linked up in a 
network with other actors and who have the "better" arguments, now 
have the power to define the course of action. 
Those former outsiders are: (i) the applied space sciences, which 
emerged as a by-product of the new space technologies (partly as quasi-
civilian copies of military fields of interest), and (ii) other subfields in 
the area of rocket engineering, which have been systematically built up 
during the 1960s (see Büdeler 1968:233-234). Both types of research 
are institutionalized in the German Grossforschungseinrichtungen (Big 
Science Laboratories), the most prominent of which is the Deutsche 
Forschungs- und Versuchsanstalt fiir Luft- und Raumfahrt (DFVLR); 
this is not only a large research center, but the parent organization of 
nearly all space research, with executive and advisory functions as weH. 
The DFVLR acts as a brain-trust for the government, and it is con-
nected in different ways with industry and the military. It receives 
one-fourth of its federal funding from the Defense Ministry (BMVg) 
and the remaining three-fourths from the Ministry of Research and 
Technology (BMFT) (in some fields, like microwave remote sensing, 
the BMVg pays even more). Only in space flight is the military totally 
absent, a fact that will be discussed later (see DFVLR 1986:9/2). 
In a "Strategy Study of Space Flight," released in 1984 as an 
expertise for the BMFT preparing the European decisions for 1985, 
the DFVLR recommended German participation in manned space 
flight as the best of a large range of alternatives. In the study those 
alternatives are seriously discussed, the costs are carefully calculated, 
and the conclusions are rather cautious. For example, it is estimated 
that a final decision about the worthiness of manned space flight cannot 
be passed before the end of the century; the study also recommends 
viewing participation in the U.S. space station as "an experimental 
256 Johannes Weyer 
bridging phase" (DFVLR 1984:xii), which doesn't require the building 
up of aseparate infrastructure. A comparison of these considerations 
with the argumentation presented by the chairman of the DFVLR, Prof. 
Hermann L. Jordan, during the parliamentary hearing in 1985, shows 
distinct variations. Here he characterized manned space flight as "indis-
pensable" (Anhörung, p. 153) and the construction of a European 
hardware as "a necessary step" (ibid.). A "simple alternative" (p. 157), 
he continued, doesn't exist; when asked for the costs, he answered: "It 
costs money" (p. 233). In his written opinion he even demanded a 
"better connection of civilian and military projects" (Stellungnahmen, p. 
7) in the German space program and a participation of the BMV g "in 
using surveillance satellites" (p. 4). During the hearing it was apparently 
not opportune to push that argument too strongly (Anhörung, p. 36). 
From this we can deduce two facts: (i) Argumentation strategies 
change depending on the context. Confronted with the public, a repre-
sentative of a research body must be able to show some results - not 
just considerations fraught with uncertainties (see Krohn 1986:24-26). 
(ii) the choice of the selected argument is not made in an accidental 
manner. It depends on the environment, and on other groups of actors 
who might be helpful in pushing the arguer's own interests (which 
actually might be served in different ways). Thus the hints given by 
Jordan concerning a future military space policy (as the DFVLR has a 
good deal of experience with military research) possess a certain logic. 
Political actors are using the scientific arguments given by the 
DFVLR as sources of legitimation; in return, they furnish this institute 
with political concepts such as "autonomy," "leadership," or "space 
defense," which serve as legitimation for certain types of R&D. It is 
thus that the DFVLR's lead in the space sciences can be attributed to 
the fact that it is part of a network. 
Politics 
In politics we can see a similar development. In the 1970s a major 
decision was taken in German space politics: to concentrate on the 
commercial use of space flight and to take the first steps toward 
manned space flight (see Büdeler 1978:25, 61). But when discussion 
about the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and the space station 
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emerged, Research Minister Riesenhuber was not really willing to join 
those projects because he couldn't see any R&D-like justification (13): 
he preferred to continue unmanned space research or to construct a 
much smaller station than Columbus (14). Riesenhuber had no allies in 
the field to push through that point of view except some "outsider" 
scientists (15) or the Green and the peace movements. The contrary 
view, however, gained strength during the SDI-discussion (see Weyer 
1986) that helped to minimize the resistance to space politics (even 
military) and brought about a specific European interpretation of space 
technologies as keys to the future (16). Baden-Württemberg's Minister 
President, Lothar Späth, is one of the spokesmen of that viewpoint, and 
he characterizes the space and defense technology industries as the 
"pulse generator for technological progress as a whole" that a modern, 
competitive economy must not miss (17). His argumentation actually 
continues a trend in former space-research policy, which since the 
1970s has been characterized by an economic orientation - that is, a 
direct support of the space industry (see "Faktenbericht," pp. 91-93). 
But now the argumentation has shifted, for (i) defense issues are 
regarded as equivalent, and (ii) the fall-out benefits from space flight, 
formerly anticipated to accrue to a small sector of the space industry, 
are now extended to the industry as a whole. 
This reference of space politics to international economic competi-
tion, to defense problems, to international obligations (concerning ESA 
and the transatlantic connection), and to the "future" have made it 
difficult for Minister Riesenhuber to resist the trend (which may in a 
few years become a serious threat to his research policy [18]). The field 
of "research policy" thus has been restructured by the recent space 
decisions, which did not follow the internal logic of the field but were 
based on arguments imported from outside (international relations, 
defense policy, economic). And the relations within the larger field of 
politics have been rearranged too - for example, in favor of defense 
and to the dis advantage of detente policy. 
In public statements, Riesenhuber finally took over the arguments in 
an apodictic mann er that formerly was uncharacteristic of hirn (19). 
The restructuring of research politics has not yet been completed, 
however. The recent discussions about the foundation of a German 
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space agency, or even aspace ministry (20), indicate that there is still a 
strong drift toward a closer connection of politics with space issues. 
This would probably weaken other areas (such as the BMFT) to the 
advantage of the hybrid space community. 
The Space Industry 
The space industry - which in Germany is almost identical to the 
technologically advanced parts of the defense industry, with significant 
overlaps with the nuclear industry - naturally has primarily economic 
interests, and thus same interest in maintaining a suitable political 
milieu in the future as well. But such a forecast doesn't extend the 
planning-horizon to more than about five years (see, e.g., Steinecke 
1986); every measure that gives returns only after ten, fifteen, or more 
years is viewed as irrelevant to industry's interests. So it can be under-
stood, that the cast of the space program must be paid by governmental 
budgets. On the other hand, the space industry has built up remarkable 
capacities in terms of highly trained staff and technically sophisticated 
apparatus, which (after having finished former contracts) call for 
follow-up actions on an ever-higher level, especially in those industries 
that operate nearly exclusively under governmental contracts. Since 
almost no relevant private market exists for the products of the defense, 
nudear, and space indust:t;ies, they are inevitably dependent on steady 
governmental support, which could better be allocated by lang-term 
programs than by sporadic measures (see Steinecke 1986). 
But the space industry is only a very small (although powerful) 
sector of German industry, with only about 4,500 people employed 
(Weltraumforschung, p. 35). Even at Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm, 
which as a whole is dependent on governmental support at a rate of 
80% (Büdeler 1982:66), the space sector covers only 4% of the group 
(p. 71). Therefore the steady promotion of the potential benefits of 
space technology for the total economy and for the future of the whole 
society is a crucial tactic in maintaining the space industry's public 
image (see BDLI 1984:6, 14). And the phantom of a so-called user-
industry waiting for the opportunity to utilize space for production, and 
so on, also plays a great part. The argumentation strategies of the 
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aerospace industry are fixed around one essential point: avoiding the 
application of the internal logic of economics to the field (that is, 
the market laws). A memorandum of Bundesverband der Deutschen 
Luftfahrt-, Raumfahrt- und Ausrüstungsindustrie (BDLI) (Federation of 
German Aeronautics, Astronautics, and Equipment Industry), released 
in 1984, argues in that way and calls for permanent subsidies (BDLI 
1984:46), for protectionism (p. 44), and for a nationalization of the 
market (p. 31). It is openly admitted that the commercial market is not 
sufficient. Consequently, the BDLI calls for political measures that 
could open the European and the world markets as weIl as the horne 
market. Frequent remarks about the necessity of a military use of space 
are part of this strategy. 
Here again, we can see externally borrowed arguments working as 
amplifiers for one's own interests, which have been transformed in a 
specific way. It is rather striking that K. H. Allgaier, top manager of 
MBB in the field of defense initiatives, declares: "For me the threat 
becomes more critical than could be expected by the Bundeswehr plan 
for the next fifteen years" (21). And one of his recommendations is to 
build up a European ATM (Anti-Tactical Missile Program) combined 
with an early warning system consisting of about 100 reconnaissance 
satellites (22). It is obvious that it is not "military needs" (WEU 1984, 
1:14) but primarily industrial interests that are pushing the formation of 
a military space market. And there is hardly any other actor on the 
stage (except the WEU) who draws attention to the military use of 
existing of future space technologies in the openhearted manner of the 
space industry (see BDLI 1984:40, 45, 49). In public, however, these 
arguments are hidden behind other scenarios, such as environmental 
protection, development aid, weather forecasting, securing the future, 
and so on (23). 
This transformation of the immediate interests of the space industry 
into the language of economics and defense again reveals the mecha-
nism, that arguments borrowed from external areas help to redefine the 
problem of the space industry (making a profit by being the techno-
logically most advanced player in the competition game) in terms of the 
problem-perception of another actor - a mechanism that imports 
credibility from outside and together puts pressure on this actor, in that 
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he loses apart of his legitimacy if he cannot show a solution to the 
problems defined in this way. And the mechanism also explains the 
political impact that a very small sector of the high-tech industry has 
gained. Finally, it can be proved that the German aerospace industry is 
a major driving force in the process of bringing about manned space 
flight on the one hand, and military uses of space on the other. 
The Military 
One remarkable fact that emerges when we compare the German and 
the U.S. or French situations, is the total absence of the military in the 
public debate about space flight. This is mainly due to the special 
situation of West Germany after 1945, which hampered the continua-
tion of a militaristic policy. In the course of time, the peaceful image of 
West Germany made itself independent in some way and began to form 
a distinct part of traditions that - for example, in research policy - are 
difficult to bypass (see Haunschild 1986:61). But the intense debate 
launched among historians in 1986 shows the attempts of some groups 
to change the conception of history and the attitude toward imperial-
istic and militaristic politics - a process that is intended to make 
Germany equal (e.g., to the French) in terms of freedom of action in 
every field of politics. 
While direct intervention of the military into the field of space flight 
is very restricted, it has to be considered that: 
(i) There is a long tradition of military involvement in space flight 
(24). 
(ii) The German military has a far-reaching influence on the civilian 
space program. 
(iii) Plans of nonofficial organizations or individuals, but also of the 
well-authorized Western European Union, for a future military 
use of space in no way have to stand outside the international 
state of the art. 
(iv) Many suspicions may be raised about the civilian use of the 
space programs of the European Space Agency (ESA) and the 
German Research Ministry (BMFT) (25). 
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The present situation in German space projects is characterized by 
different ways of informal incorporation of the military into the deci-
sion-making process on the one hand (IABG 1986:8), and by an 
evident orientation of space R&D toward the so-called "utilizing body" 
BMVg (Ministry of Defense) on the other (DFVLR 1986:5/2). The 
latter can be found even in cases where the military doesn't pay for the 
research projects (see DFVLR 1986:1/1-6,9/2). And it is a remark-
able tendency to be discovered in the DFVLR budget that the civilian 
BMFT totally finances the (partly international) basic research - for 
example, in microwave remote sensing (DFVLR 1986:6/5) - while the 
military application of that technology is exclusively BMVg-financed 
(ibid.:6/2, 9/2). Such indications may raise the suspicion that civilian 
programs, especially when conducted in international, peaceful coopera-
tion, are at least dosely coordinated with military interests. The IABG 
(Industrieanlagen-Betriebsgesellschaft) - one of the government-related 
brain trusts - provides us with a logical explanation of these facts: "A 
further reason for the restrictive attitude of the BMV g may be seen in 
the fact, that the announcement of a demand within the BMVg would 
lead to the announcer's taking over the costs to the total extent" (IABG 
1986:30). 
As space projects do not possess the highest priority within present 
"Bundeswehr" planning, and concrete military requirements transfor-
mable into research or procurement orders are not at hand (see IABG 
1986:8, 30), it seems to be reasonable that the military remains in a 
waiting position as long as the technologies developed by BMFT and 
ESA do not drift in a direction that would be useless to the military. 
There is a prominent reason for the absence of the military in the 
discussion: The frame of reference of the space debate - be it the U.S. 
or the French space program - is fundamentally military-oriented, so 
that the military as an actor need only come into play if the plans of the 
other groups involved deviate substantially from copying, for example, 
the V.S. model. In this way the German military profits from the 
military character of the space discussion elsewhere. Why should the 
military risk direct intervention into space projects if even the planned 
space station is connected in the DFVLR plans with the "utilizing 
body," the BMVg? (26). 
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On the other hand, there exists a specific German interest in a 
so-called extended air-defense (also named European Defense Initia-
tive, EDI), which is not only SDI-related, but also necessarily partly 
space-based, even if the defense minister hesitates to admit that in 
public. His undersecretary, Lothar Rühl, knows the correlations very 
weil (see BMVg 1986:59-60, 63); he is also one of the authors of a 
memorandum that outlines a future military involvement in space from 
the perspective of Germany as a new superpower (see section III, 
below). But apart from these future scenarios, which sometimes do not 
conceal their references to certain political traditions or their radical 
militarism (27), the international military integration plays a decisive 
role in future space-defense politics. It is not only, as mentioned above, 
the SDI program that made access of the military in Europe to outer 
space more acceptable: the BMVg also participates in the NATO 
satellite systems Satcom and Navstar (IABG 1986:8, 30; see also 
Althainz et al. 1984, and Scheffran 1984 and 1985). 
The most prominent step toward the creation of an independent 
European space power was the revitalization of the WEU and the 
dealing of that body with military space matters. In 1984 a recom-
mendation of the WEU was passed calling for "a defensive European 
military space programme" inside "an institutional framework untram-
melled by the political inhibitions of the ESA convention" (WEU 
1984, 1:2), but nevertheless making use of nearly all the ESA-founded 
space technologies, such as ERS-Statellite (microwave remote sensing), 
Meteosat (weather satellite), space station, shuttle Hermes, and so on 
(pp. 3, 14-15). The report given to prepare the WEU decision pas-
sionately argued against the hope of a "considerable technological 
spin-off' (p. 14) from the space station and called instead for a military 
use of space, which would make the enormous amount of money to be 
spent more reasonable. The report also showed that priorities should 
be given to the following four elements: (i) telecommunication satellites 
(soon available), (ii) a military observation satellite system (prototypes 
in construction), (iii) a navigation satellite system (planned), and (iv) 
attack satellites (no priority) (pp. 13-15). Antisatellite weapons, large-
payload launchers (Ariane), and the shuttle Hermes were added to the 
list of wishes of the military, too. Here again it can be seen that ESA 
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technologies are at least compatible with military interests, and the 
military is now going to lay claim to those - all civilian-financed -
projects. 
It can only be speculated that the German military plays a part in 
these plans. But the minimum that can be concluded is this: The frame 
of reference for the decisions of the military has seriously changed since 
Star Wars, and space defense is on the agenda. It has become increas-
ingly easier to demand certain types of space techniques if such demand 
can be supported by establishing links to other reference groups. 
Hence we can analyze this actor, too, in the same way as the others 
above. The changing ambience has deeply influenced the structure of 
the field to the extent that space defense is now a matter of political 
debate. The support from outside (especially by means of international 
military cooperation, as in NATO and the WEU) has strengthened -
or is going to strengthen - those elements within the military who put 
emphasis on future space-based defense scenarios. The mutual relations 
with other groups of actors are consolidating (which means the network 
grows and becomes tighter), so that those actors now can refer to a 
military demand that helps to legitimate political strategies and -
above all - industrial requests. 
Conclusion 
In reviewing the German space program and the actors engaged in it we 
have a situation similar to that which other analysts of technological 
dynamics have previously found (see Kitschelt 1979, Radkau 1983 and 
1986): There is no clearly identifiable steering-center; instead, there is a 
sum of actors with initially different interests, merging together by 
processes of mutual reinforcement of their positions and interdepen-
dencies in a way that can be shown as a translation of arguments into 
the language and terms of the partner, thus initiating new problem-
perceptions on the one hand and borrowing legitimacy on the other. 
The mechanism analyzed works in two directions: first, by rearranging 
the frame of reference the co-players make use of when reaching their 
decisions; and secondly, by using the external environment as a re-
source that supplies the power to restructure the field one belongs to 
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(these being two ways of viewing the same mechanism). In the final 
section of this paper the idea outlined here will be discussed again. 
But first it is essential to look at the hybrid structures and the new 
institutional settings emerging in the space field. We will take a memo-
randum released in 1986 by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige 
Politik (DGAP) (German Society for Foreign Policy) as an indicator of 
the state of the discussion inside that hybrid structure. The DGAP 
memorandum unites representatives from all the areas mentioned 
above; it can be viewed as one attempt to harmonize the different 
positions and to find some sort of common phraseology, which is 
indispensable for a confrontation with the public outside the space 
lobby. (For localization of the DGAP in the field, see figure 2.) 
III. German Space Plans and Their Financial and Social Costs 
The technological and political aims of the West German space lobby 
are frequently described by representative bodies of this group that 
exert an intermediary function and thus form a sort of inner core. They 
can be located in political research institutes, foundations, and other 
organizations of that kind, which are not (or not primarily) part of one 
faction. These hybrid organizations usually not only serve in coordinat-
ing the space lobby, they also aim at influencing public opinion. They 
thus serve an important function for the public relations of the space 
lobby that exceeds that of the individual inner-systemic actors. It is 
important to mention that the legitimation of the space lobby's requests 
with reference to the environment (society, public, politics) requires 
other forms of argumentation strategies than those needed in the inside 
relations between the different groups - a phenomenon al ready men-
tioned above. 
One central demand to be found in this context is the goal of making 
Western Europe a "space power of the twenty-first century" - a 
demand that calls for an enforced European and German "engagement 
in space" (DGAP 1986:43). Though Germany is working toward these 
aims within a European structure, it becomes evident that such co-
operation has only a tactical importance for the final goal: "to realize 
West German space power by means of a European cooperation" 
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(ibid., emphasis added). Within the frame of the European Space 
Agency with its already advanced rocket program Ariane, the planned 
European contribution to the V.S. space station Columbus, and the 
1986 predecided plans for building a mini shuttle called Hermes, Ger-
many shall - following the words of the space lobby - playa greater 
part in deciding, financing, and performing future projects. 
The self-perception of the lobby - as among others presented 
during a parliamentary hearing in 1985, or in the DGAP memorandum 
"German Space Policy at the threshold of the Century" (released in 
1986) - about the importance of the period of the mid- and late 
eighties is that West Germany needs a long-range political program 
based on a "reorientation of German space policy" (DGAP 1986:38), if 
the country does not want to risk losing its political and economic 
position in the world and if it wants to profit from the military potential 
of space flight. In the words of the cited memorandum, space activities 
enable the countries engaged "to strengthen substantially their political 
and economic influence and thereby their position within the inter-
national community"; and some sentences later, with greater clarity: "At 
the bottom of that race for predominance in space are . . . primary 
geopolitical and military profits" (DGAP 1986:21). 
This basic assumption, that Germany is forced to participate in the 
space race in a more intensive way and in a more competitive manner, 
leads to the following consequences: 
(i) Europe has to gain "autonomy" (Anhörung, p. 112) in space. This 
means getting rid of the dependence on U.S. space flight, which has 
sometimes been shamelessly exploited by the Vnited States in the past. 
As the principles of space flight are the same for all countries, Europe 
must install a perfect copy of the V.S. technical configuration; this 
me ans constructing the "triad" of Ariance (the launching system), 
Hermes (the transport system for manned missions, too), and Columbus 
(the space platform in a lower orbit). 
(ii) Europe must change direction and enter the sphere of manned 
space flight. Though everyone knows that "space sciences would prefer 
unmanned stations or space probes," manned systems are estimated to 
be irreplaceable because of their "higher political symbol - effect" 
(DGAP 1986:38). Even if there exist no more arguments for manned 
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space flight than national identity and international symbolic competi-
tion, the entire European space concept and its enormous costs are 
centered on "man in space." 
(iii) If geopolitical power will depend in future not only on the 
possession of atomic weapons, but more and more on the possession of 
space weapons, then participation in the space race is unavoidable for a 
country that is defined - at least by the space lobby - as a future 
world power. The memorandum thus calls for an "adaptation of the 
defense concept to technological development in the East and West" 
(DGAP 1986:42), as apart of the notion that West Germany should be 
"a shaping force of the Western European space power" (ibid.). The 
demand "partially to correct the political power imbalance between the 
superpowers and the European states ... in the area of space policy" 
(p. 22) shows a policy-conception, underlying the space program, 
whose fixed points are the correction of the postwar political constella-
tion and the reentry of Germany into the club of superpowers (28). 
The realization of this concept means - and the space lobby is well 
aware of this - a far-reaching reorientation of West German and 
European space policy. Both have in former times focused on peaceful 
space research, with an emphasis on such scientifically useable and 
commercializable projects as, for example, the most successful rocket 
Ariane. But the described aims require a fundamental shift in program 
structure and research priorities, in technical configuration, and - last 
but not least - in the financial volume of space research. The recent 
decision for the new Ariane V shows that the ESA program is headed 
in the direction promoted by the space lobby (29). 
The decision for the space trio of Ariane, Columbus, and Hermes can 
in no way be compared with any previous decision for other big 
technologies (30). The amount of money required is hardly foreseeable, 
and the financial consequences will probably lead to sociopolitical 
measures and to reorientations of research priorities that are even now 
(before any social opposition has formed) being anticipated and inten-
sively discussed by the space lobby. Let us look at the costs: 
It is assumed that the German share of the R&D costs of all three 
projects (31) will be about 6.5 billion DM, to be paid within about eight 
or ten years. It results from the following items: The development of 
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Ariane V will require, up to 1994/95, about 7.5 billion DM, with a 
German share of 22% (1.65 billion DM); for Columbus the same 
amount has to be spent, but Germany will contribute 38% (2.85 billion 
DM). The fulfillment of these obligations already requires a raise in the 
German space budget from 1.1 billion DM (1986) to 1.6 billion DM 
(1992), which is frequently demanded by representatives of the space 
lobby (32). There are even some who insist on a "doubling of the space 
budget within the next ten years," thus reaching the V.S. rate of 55 DM 
per inhabitant per year, or in other words, a German space budget of 
about 3.3 billion DM (33). 
But the story doesn't end here; there is still Hermes to be paid for 
(34). It is estimated that Hermes will cost about 5 to 6 billion DM , but 
insiders know that this assessment is much too low. As the well-
informed Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung states, the experts "even 
today calculate with sums twice as high or more" (25 August 1986; 
emphasis added). If the costs were to remain constant (which nobody 
expects), Germany would have to pay, at the rate of 30 to 33%, the 
sum of about 2 billion DM for Hermes - which means a total contribu-
tion of about 6.5 billion DM to the Western European space program. 
No one knows where to acquire such funds, and when the members of 
Parliament asked the lobbyists during the hearing in the German 
Bundestag in 1985 they got neither answers concerning the total 
amount of money to be spent, nor any sign of willingness on the side of 
industry to contribute financial support. The lobbyists simply refused to 
give answers or side-stepped (Anhörung, p. 205), as shown in the 
following example: "It requires time and costs money. The efforts are 
worthwhile, however" (Anhörung, p. 233). 
A very popular argument - weIl known from the U.S. shuttle - is 
the promise of reducing space transport costs in some twenty or thirty 
years (see Anhörung, p. 246) which is one of the major arguments to 
support Saenger (35). But the fact is that the total system will cost West 
Germany at least 6.5 billion DM, or one entire annual research budget 
(which in 1987 is at a level of about 7.5 billion DM). This fact makes 
space technology an absolute novelty in the history of German research 
policy; even the fast breeder, when contracted in 1972 (with total costs 
estimated at 1.54 billion DM), demanded "only" half of the annual 
research budget (1973: 3.14 billion DM) (see Keck 1984:206). 
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We also have to take into consideration the fact that Hermes - and 
probably the other components of the system, too - will effectively 
cost twice as much or more. If we characterize space technology as 
being in many ways an unpredictable line of technological development 
similar to the fast breeder (36), and if we take into consideration the 
cost explosion of the German breeder from 310 million DM (first plans 
in 1961), to 1.535 billion DM (contract in 1972), to 6.05 billion DM in 
1982 (see Keck 1984:203-208) and some billions more in 1986, with 
a gradient factor of about 5 (from 1972 to 1986), we can easily 
produce three alternative scenarios of estimation and assessment of the 
sums to be spent for the space pro gram. This will enable us to draw 
some conclusions concerning further research policy. 
Tables 1 and 2 show the development of the German space research 
TABLE 1 
Development of the German Space Research Budget 
(compared with the total and the nuclear research budget) 
Year BMFT (total) SpaceR&D NuclearR&D Space Nuclear 
a.i. a.i. a.i. %BMFT %BMFT 
1973 3,140 600 770 19.1 24.5 
1974 3,680 17.2 590 -1.7 810 5.2 16.0 22.0 
1975 4,080 10.9 580 -1.7 1,200 48.1 14.2 29.4 
1976 3,960 -2.9 650 12.1 1,310 9.2 16.4 33.1 
1977 4,210 6.3 610 -6.2 1,410 7.6 14.5 33.5 
1978 4,950 17.6 660 8.2 1,530 8.5 13.3 30.9 
1979 5,570 12.5 730 10.6 1,650 7.8 13.1 29.6 
1980 5,840 4.8 790 8.2 1,810 9.7 13.5 31.0 
1981 6,070 3.9 800 1.3 1,980 9.4 13.2 32.6 
1982 7,080 16.6 880 10.0 2,700 36.4 12.4 38.1 
1983 6,920 -2.3 900 2.3 2,570 -4.8 13.0 37.1 
1984 7,050 1.9 900 0.0 2,620 1.9 12.8 37.2 
1985 7,200 2.1 960 6.7 2,650 1.1 13.3 36.8 
1986 7,410 2.9 1,111 15.7 2,470 -6.8 15.0 33.3 
1987 D 7,560 2.0 1,261 13.5 2,323 -6.0 16.7 30.7 
Inc. 1983-87 2.2 9.0 -2.4 
(average) 
a.i. = annual increase; all references in million DM. 
(Source: Bundeshaushaltsgesetze 1973 passim) 
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TABLE 2 
Linear extrapolation of the German Space Research Budget up to 1995 based on the 
average increase 1983-1987 
(compared with the total and the nuc1ear research budget) 
Year BMFT (total) SpaceR&D Nuc1earR&D Space Nuc1ear 
a.i. a.i. a.i. %BMFf %BMFf 
1981 6,070 800 1,980 13.2 32.6 
1982 7,080 16.6 880 10.0 2,700 36.4 12.4 38.1 
1983 6,920 -2.3 900 2.3 2,570 -4.8 13.0 37.1 
1984 7,050 1.9 900 0.0 2,620 1.9 12.8 37.2 
1985 7,200 2.1 960 6.7 2,650 1.1 13.3 36.8 
1986 7,410 2.9 1,111 15.7 2,470 -6.8 15.0 33.3 
1987 7,560 2.0 1,261 13.5 2,323 -6.0 16.7 30.7 
1988 7,726 2.2 1,374 9.0 2,267 -2.4 17.8 29.3 
1989 7,896 2.2 1,498 9.0 2,213 -2.4 19.0 28.0 
1990 8,070 2.2 1,633 9.0 2,160 -2.4 20.2 26.8 
1991 8,248 2.2 1,780 9.0 2,108 -2.4 21.6 25.6 
1992 8,429 2.2 1,940 9.0 2,057 -2.4 23.0 24.4 
1993 8,614 2.2 2,115 9.0 2,008 -2.4 24.5 23.3 
1994 8,804 2.2 2,305 9.0 1,960 -2.4 26.2 22.3 
1995 8,998 2.2 2,513 9.0 1,913 -2.4 27.9 21.3 
Inc.1983-87 2.2 9.0 -2.4 
(average) 
a.i. = annual increase; all references in million DM. 
(Source: Bundeshaushaltsgesetze 1981 passim) 
budget in the past and a linear extrapolation up to 1985, based on the 
average increase rate of the last five years. Table 3 and figure 3 try to 
assess the future development of the space budget: scenario A supposes 
constant prices, scenario B assumes a doubling of costs, and scenario C 
hypothesizes an explosion of costs by a factor of 5. All three scenarios 
entail attempts to manage the growing problems by redistribution of 
funds within the research budget. There is also the underlying assump-
tion that funds have to be spent, not constantly, but with a maximum in 
the years 1992/93. 
With the help of these three scenarios the problems of the German 
space commitment can clearly be shown. Even the sums resulting from 
scenario A could be managed only by a constantly increasing space 
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Fig. 3. Assessment of costs of space-scenarios. 
budget; scenario B can only be performed by a new distribution of 
funds both within the space budget (to the dis advantage of other 
programs, such as space science), and within the entire R&D budget (to 
the dis advantage of such areas as health, ecological, social, and other 
research). But scenario C - which may be the realistic one - shows 
how the space budget will "eat up" the R&D budget from the inside, 
thus provoking a search for other sources of financial support. Herein 
lies the major force affecting future German research policy, even if the 
entry into space flight is less spectacular than in the United States (or in 
science fiction). Given the case of an explosion - either of costs or of 
the launching system - the hold of other projects with more reserve 
capital on the space program is practically preprogrammed, which 
would probably lead to an altogether new strategy of space flight and 
space research (37). And as has been shown above, these considera-
tions are no mere speculation. 
We can conclude, simply by looking at the financial situation of the 
space program, that a shift in balance from civilian to other types of 
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space research (which may be military) and a massive burden on the 
federal budget are preprogrammed. If they come about, these incidents 
would create an important restructuring of the whole field. The space 
lobby is well aware of these problems, as the DGAP memorandum 
points out: "An essential intensification of Germany's space engagement 
will make sensitive displacements in the federal budget necessary ... " 
(DGAP 1986:39). Because the decisions of the mid-eighties are regarded 
as fundamental determinations that will commit a great amount of 
money and research personnel to space activities for aperiod of at least 
fifteen years (see Anhörung, p. 204), the space advocates see quite 
clearly that the government ''would be forced to cancel considerable 
sums in other relevant political areas" (DGAP 1986:43). 
To avoid foreseeable political trouble, the DGAP memorandum 
recommends that the German population should be convinced of the 
necessity of space flight (DGAP 1986:39-40) and that the space lobby 
should concentrate its political activities on the public "legitimation" 
(ibid., p. 13) of space policy. Here we can see an interesting example of 
plans to use public debate as a source of support for the space 
program, and of well-thought-out ideas of modern sociomanagement 
aimed at convincing people to favor a policy they would normally 
resist. The space lobby is well aware that the management of their 
outside relations is a crucial point for succeeding with their politics, and 
that organizations specialized in public relations are required. But the 
major aim of the lobby is to keep the ongoing discussions on a level 
that does not advance to a principled jeopardizing of the space 
program. 
Because it is obvious that, once they are fixed, decisions have a kind 
of irreversibility and self-dynamics, the principal appointments should 
- according to the space lobby - be made now, programmatically, 
without any technology assessment. Or, in the words of the research 
minister: "It will later be the task to decide whether the expenses were 
profitable" (38). The motto "decide now, and think about it when 
nothing can be discussed any more" is very popular in the debate. But 
at the same time one is conscious of the fact that such a mechanism 
cannot work forever. Similar to U.S. models of multiyear authorization, 
the German space lobby is attempting to decouple the space program 
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from public control on the one hand, and from incalculable discon-
tinuities in the democratic and parliamentary procedure on the other. 
The president of the Berlin Technical University, Manfred Fricke, 
declared in his opinion before the parliamentary committee: "Nothing is 
more harmful to a long-term proteetion of existence than turning only 
towards partial solutions oriented to election dates" (Stellungnahmen, p. 
7). Space scientist Klaus Pinkau of the Max Planck Institute reflected 
publicIy about the incompetence of the research ministry to plan and to 
carry out the space program (Anhörung, pp. 124-125) - reflections 
that led to the idea of anational space center by strengthening the 
DFVLR on the one hand, and by a partial reorganization of the 
European Space Agency (ESA) on the other hand, in such a manner 
that public controls on both levels are diminished (DGAP 1986:54-
55; Anhörung, p. 158). Here, as weIl as in the budget discussions, we 
can see the space lobby busily trying to extend the area of their 
influence into other fields. 
Loud voices are proposing that space policy should be nationalized 
(against ESA) while at the same time the space program should be 
carried out under a new authority that is not obliged to the research 
policy of the Research Ministry alone, but is also open to other 
interests, which - following the proposals of space advocates - should 
be military, too (39). As Dornier manager Helmut Ulke points out, 
"more ministries should engage in space flight (postal services, defense, 
interior, developmerit aid)"; he continues: "It would be necessary to 
build up a German space agency to conduct these tasks of coordination 
and goal formulation" (Stellungnahmen, p. 9). In the same way, the 
DGAP memorandum calls for other ministries to engage in, and to pay 
for, German space activities (DGAP 1986:56) - though there can be 
no doubt that it is the defense ministry that is primarily meant. 
There exists, thus, a large amount of evidence for potential future 
military involvemerlt in space flight, which indicates that the center of 
gravity within the field will be shifted in the direction of the military 
(see figure 2). This analysis also shows, however, that the public is a 
crucial factor that shapes the strategy and tactics of the space lobby in 
an important manner. At times one truly has the feeling that the lobby 
274 Johannes Weyer 
is playing agame with the public, as when one reads: " ... confronted 
with the public ... one should point out in the first instance the 
economic and social advantages" of space flight (DGAP 1986:40) - a 
statement to be found only a few sentences after explanations of the 
redirection of funds in the federal budget to the disadvantage of social, 
health, ecological, and other issues. 
The next section will discuss some recent legitimation strategies and 
will include considerations about the relation of civilian and military 
use of space, because problems of legitimation can arise only if there is 
a barrier between two areas (consisting of the lack of direct connections 
or applications) that must be bridged argumentatively. 
IV. The Problem ofPublic Legitimation and the Military Use ofSpace 
Flight 
Two facts must be borne in mind. First, German research policy is 
aiming for development of the same technologies as the SDI program, 
because these technologies are estimated to be the key for the future; 
this assertion applies equally to the European EUREKA program (40). 
The frequent hints that Europe has to counterbalance the U.S. efforts 
(which are carried out within a military program) by its own research 
activities (41) point out this close connection of research goals. The 
only clear difference lies in the fact that any sort of concrete goal-
definition comparable to the "construction of a strategie missile defense" 
is missing in German and European programs, which thus seem to 
demand the development of rather unspecific technologies. 
Secondly, there no longer exists a general resistance to the publicly 
pronounced promotion of military research. As R&D Undersecretary 
Hans-Hilger Haunschild has pointed out, he sees "a clear separation" of 
civilian and military research, but his reference to the equality and 
interchangeability of both "fields of responsibility," as he calls it 
(1986:61), shows a remarkable upgrading of military research, which 
can thus be considered as legitimate as civilian research. Former 
barriers are being dropped, as Research Minister Riesenhuber did 
when he declared that EUREKA-sponsored research "could be applied 
in the military sector, too" (42). We find this trend also in space 
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research, where the lobbyists complain that the situation of German 
industry in international competition is "today unbalanced, since only 
West Germany ... doesn't carry out military space projects" (43) -
and yet, at the same time, there exist detailed plans for a European 
Anti-Tactical Missile Program (ATM) (DGAP 1986:30, 48-49), 
which will lead to a European Defense Initiative (EDI) that can be 
combined with SDI (44). 
Besides a number of hidden hints, we can find a frank and open-
hearted description of the military character of the European space 
program given by Ernst Högenauer, a leading scientist of the biggest 
aerospace trust in Germany (Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm), in a 
widely circulated public magazine - a procedure that has some of the 
character of launching a test-balloon to explore the public acceptability 
of military space plans. Högenauer points out that hypersonic space-
crafts like the European shuttle Hermes are of great importance for 
both military and civilian aeronautics, thus focusing not on the direct 
military use of space technology but on a celestial spin-off for terrestrial 
purposes. Concerning military fields of application he writes: "For 
military aeronautics, hypersonic planes represent the perspective for the 
next generation of combat fighters"; these fighters would be able to 
reach "any point of the world within one hour," to "move above a low 
orbit" or to "stay for longer periods combat-ready in this orbit" (45). 
On the other hand, the perspectives for a civilian hypersonic transport 
plane are so vague that even Högenauer admits: 
Though the civil application of hypersonic technology may seem possible only after this 
development has been sufficiently qualified by space flight and the military, the civilian 
concept has at least got an adequate name for the present: Orient Express (46). 
There exist, as the Concorde disaster shows, no reasonable civilian 
applications of that technology, and probably there never will be any 
(despite the weak comfort of giving the "project" a name) - and the 
cited representative of the rnilitary-industrial complex is fully aware of 
this fact. The problem is: How can we justify plans of thls kind? 
It is my hypothesis that space flight nowadays is no more than the 
continuation of a former exclusively military technology with a new 
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civilian label, a sort of (additionally "invented") external defense belt 
(47) constructed around the hard core of military space flight - thus 
protecting military purposes from public inquiry and broadening the 
ways of acquiring funds for this very expensive research and technol-
ogy. This switch in labeling and legitimation (but not in fields of 
application, as I will show below) was accentuated by Undersecretary 
Haunschild, who characterized hypersonic research as a "classic field of 
activity of military research" (1986:62). It was only after the discussion 
about a European shuttle, Haunschild believes, that another field of 
application emerged (he avoids the term "civiiian"!), though it is still 
"unproven" that anything in this sphere makes sense in economic terms. 
But the following sentence is remarkable: "Obviously the primary 
foundation for such technologies can reverse to defense technology" 
(ibid.). 
Here the dual-use thesis in its latest version - the assertion of the 
interchangeability of application and legitimation - is used to establish 
the equality of both types of research as different means to serve the 
common goal: the development of high technology. If a former military 
technology can be pursued in a civilian context, then - according to 
this thesis - it doesn't matter in which area the research is done. This 
thesis has replaced the untenable spin-off thesis during recent years, but 
it is based on the premise that underneath the interchangeability of 
legitimation strategies (a case whose functioning still has to be ex-
plained) there exists a factual interchangeability of technologies 
between the different fields of application. This thesis only works in our 
context because space flight is regarded as a civilian purpose, but the 
suspicion arises that military technology has found a convenient label -
especially in a country where military research was forbidden for a time 
(48). 
If, for the time being, we accept the assumption that space flight is a 
civilian undertaking, then it is our task to ask for reasonable projects in 
space flight and space research that will support civilian interests; these 
interests might be. primarily economic and scientific, but could be 
cultural, ecological, social, and international-relations as weIl. If you ask 
the space advocates to deliver civilian-based arguments for space flight, 
you will very quickly be confronted with the fact that there are none, 
European Star Wars 277 
except for some vague hopes and speculations that are in no way 
comparable to the very concrete plans for military use - for example, 
for a European ATM Defense System (EDI). 
This is the lesson that the members of the German Bundestag 
learned when examining the arguments of the space lobby in 1985. 
Without reproducing and commenting on the whole affair here at 
length, the core argument is: There is no convincing argument for entry 
into manned space flight, but just because there is "no logical evidence" 
(Anhörung, p. 142) we should take exactly this risky step to get rid of 
our knowledge deficit. The space scientist Erhard Keppler called this 
argument (which was nonetheless also his own) a "logical crack" (ibid.), 
to follow which one required a whole portion of irrationality and 
metaphysics. 
The best way to answer the question about potential civilian uses of 
space technology is to ask the carefully ca1culating industry whether an 
aerospace firm would enter the field of manned space flight and make 
investments in the hope of getting a profitable return. The answer again 
is disappointing: neither the U.S. nor the German aerospace industry 
spends a penny on any space project in which the government does not 
invest more than one-and-a-half times as much, and the nonspace 
industry has no interest at all (49). In the German D-l mission in 1985, 
only three experiments came from German industry. During the parlia-
mentary hearing, the MBB representative Othmar Reise presented the 
calculations of industry as follows: "Space flight ... is a technology that 
upon application today cannot be said to yield a sufficient return on 
investment" (Anhörung, p. 206). 
At this point one cannot identify any civilian application of manned 
space flight. For scientific purposes man is only an interference factor, 
as James Van Allen pointed out very convincingly (50). The economi-
cally profitable sector of space nowadays is the geo-constant orbit, 
which can be reached by "simply," "cheap," and unmanned thrciw-away 
rockets available today (51). Material experiments in space laboratories 
still have few or disappointing results (Anhörung, p. 178), and even if 
success is attained there will be no prospect for removing the motor 
industry to space, as the critical scientist Rans-Peter Dürr remarked 
(Anhörung, p. 180). Not least important: celestial spin-offs for civilian 
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applications, such as the successful Dornier Nierenlithotripter, are so 
scarce that they cannot justify the enormous costs of today's space 
flight, nor those of future projects. Further, these spin-offs mostly co me 
into existence by pure chance, like the new material for an artificial 
hip-joint that came out of Tornado aircraft research (see Abstein 
1986). 
One potential objection against these arguments is that in some 
fifteen or twenty years manned space flight might be commercially 
viable, too, thus following the example of the Ariane success (see 
Junker 1986) - but this objection is valid only if you exclude from the 
calculation the billions of dollars spent before (which governments 
usually do, as with space flight or nuclear energy). Under the conditions 
of an independent cost-benefit analysis, enterprises (German as weIl as 
U.S.) are simply disinterested in the utilization of space (52). There is 
no civilian, commercial, or scientific demand for manned space flight, 
even if in some unforeseeable future an artificially produced "market" 
(which is really a balance of different modes of subsidies) may emerge. 
Another potential objection might be the question of military uses of 
manned space flight. Obviously all military missions may be performed 
by automatic systems, and such ideas as the use of the shuttle for a 
battle-observation and battle-management platform seem to be a bit 
antiquated in times of worldwide data communication. But there are 
some reasonable arguments for the military use of manned space flight 
(which are at least more reasonable than the arguments for civilian use): 
(i) During the construction, installation, and testing of new automatie 
weapons systems in space, man could be a help. 
(ii) It is unavoidable for the military to keep up with the state of the 
art in the field of weapons technology, which means being prepared for 
the future option of a new battlefield in space. 
(iii) Research done in space projects has several applications (spin-
offs) in the field of so-called conventional military technology - that is, 
in constructing new "intelligent" weapons with novel features and new 
missions that might be superior to the enemy's capabilities. 
(iv) Last, and not least: even the military profits from the symbolic 
effect of manned space flight and from the public enthusiasm and 
willingness to pay for rather expensive space projects. 
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We can summarize here that it will remain a difficult task for the space 
lobby to justify all the planned space research in view of the lack of 
civilian uses. The public seems to be a crucial frame of reference for the 
strategies of the space lobby that determines their actions in a certain 
way - for example, forcing the lobby to increase the acceptability of 
space projects by relabeling them. On the other hand, we see the 
lobby's attempt to influence public opinion and decrease the general 
resistance to military plans (which had been increased by the so-called 
Nachrüstung with Pershing 2 and cruise missiles). Here we can see an 
example of the "struggle for borders" (Krohn and Küppers 1987:5) 
taking place between different systems and their respective environ-
ments. 
v. Conclusion 
In this paper an attempt has been made to analyze the emergence of a 
novel space technology (manned space flight) and to interpret current 
changes in R&D policy in West Germany by using elements of the con-
cept of self-organization. The so-called space lobby has been described 
as a social structure that emerged through the interplay of (for the 
present) quite different interest groups; parallel to the generation 
of a new production (a novel big technology), this structure gained 
coherence and obtained a specific stability and self-dynamics, thus 
producing irreversibilities. The mechanism that brings this hybrid com-
munity together can be analyzed as a complex process of adjustment of 
interests and transformation of arguments. One or the major efforts of 
the actors in this process is to reformulate arguments in a way that 
makes them suitable for the pregiven social constellation and interest 
structure. 
The transformation of one's own arguments into the language of 
another co-actor serves the following purposes: 
(i) it imports credibility, and thus legitimation, by the appeal to 
external arguments that are used as unassailable resources; 
(ii) it enables the carrying out of (internal) innovation processes 
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because they can be defined in respect to the outside as follow-
up actions; 
(iii) it helps to relabel planned actions and programs, thus immuniz-
ing them against critics and other risks; and 
(iv) it makes the co-actor jointly responsible for the maintenance of 
one's own position and forces hirn to act. 
Thus the transformation of arguments helps to bring formerly incon-
sistent positions together - such as military and unemployed (because 
of the jobs the military industry can supply), or military and ecology 
(because of the capabilities of pollution detection by space satellites), 
and so on. But while producing a great deal of external support, the 
adjustment of interest entails also the necessity of political and technical 
compromise. It is no longer possible to pursue one's own interests in a 
straightforward manner, for the redefinition of problems in terms of the 
perceptions of the co-actor also means a partial departure from strong 
selfish interests. For example, the German defense industry would 
prefer national arms programs; but because these are not politically 
acceptable, the industry is forced into international cooperation despite 
such perceived hazards as, for example, the danger of "technological 
impoverishment" (Lamatsch 1986). 
Compromises are often painful if compared with short-term inter-
ests. But in the long run, the way of compromise mostly serves to better 
all interests. Through negotiation the perceptions of other actors and of 
potential refusers come into play, and the outcome of the negotiation 
process is more stable than pigheadedly enforced politics. Because the 
result of successful negotiations is an emerging process of mutual 
reinforcement, the system then gains a strength and self-dynamics that a 
sole actor could never gain. And the resources of mutual legitimation 
are - as has been shown above - much more manifold in such a social 
structure than in a monolithic system. This may explain the dynamics 
and innovation capacities of such structures, as weIl as their stability 
and resistance to "ex"-external influences. 
But is has to be asked how innovations (technical as weIl as social) of 
this kind can emerge, given that the different co-actors stern from fields 
far removed from each other. The construction of social networks can 
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be explained as follows (53): Each social system (politics, economy, 
science, and others) is conservative, to the extent that the working of 
the internal mechanism does not produce any innovation or change. 
But the maintenance of a system entails a dependence on resources 
supplied by the environment, and the inclusion of the environment 
leads to dis order inside the system. (Some environmental facts may be 
results of the actions of other systems, which in that way rearrange the 
frame of reference for their co-actors.) Innovation can now take place 
if this disorder works as an amplifier for nonconservative, mostly 
marginal, positions. The balance of power within the field can be 
rearranged if such positions make use of the environment by importing 
arguments, or resources (e.g., research funding), or credibility (as in the 
case analyzed above). A special situation occurs if, in different fields, 
actors are in the play who have analogous or even common interests; 
this may lead to hybrid structures (as in the space field), which may 
even make themselves independent. These processes are intensified by 
the fact that each system is forced to speak to its environment in a non-
systemic, but common, language. Special problems cannot be repre-
sen ted to the outside without this language. Such transformations to 
another language, or even another problem's perception, in turn shape 
the seIf-image of the system (as, for example, the notion of the social 
usefulness of science has increasingly become part of its image, even if 
it is not necessary for the functioning of its internallogic). 
When an innovation has been achieved and a network has been 
constructed, in a second stage the new social structure begins to 
stabilize itself by processes of autonomization and immunization. The 
network increasingly becomes the frame of reference, though the actors 
are still part of the field they depend on. But attempts to extend the 
borders of the hybrid structure (even if not a social system in a strict 
sense), and to expand the area of influence, show a distinct shift from 
the construction of intern al coherence to the struggle with other 
external claims. The mid-eighties may be regarded as the transition 
from the first to the second stage in space policy in Germany. Manned 
space flight has gained a self-dynamics that begins to exceed even the 
genuine interests of the different actors and thus seems to be un-
stoppable. The build up of military space technology (which many of 
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the actors surely do not ask for) appears more and more inevitable in 
order to avoid riskingjobs, security, the future, and so on. 
We can only speculate about the consequences for science (and for 
R&D policy as weH) if the involvement into structures (such as the 
space lobby) grows, or, more generally, if network structures, affecting 
science in a similar way, become tighter. The externalization of the 
definition of problems (54) and the partial dissolution of the internal 
logic of science are, in themselves, not the crucial problem, as the 
model "finalization of science" has already pointed out (see Böhme, 
Daele, and Krohn 1973). If science generally is open for external 
control, then militarization is one of the results possible. But it is in no 
way a constraint, for other alternatives exist. And the model used in the 
present analysis shows a mechanism that may just as easily lead to the 
current situation in space policy as it may lead out of it again. The 
public has been confirmed as a crucial factor, together with the peace 
movement, and scientific and political organizations. All these elements 
are part of the process, even if they sometimes feel helpless in view of 
the power of the military-industrial complex. Every ac tor in the field 
actively shapes the frame of reference inside which the other actors can 
only move. The case of manned space flight in Germany is proof of the 
fact that the emergence and development of technology can be recon-
structed as a line of selection of alternatives that are generated and 
shaped by social processes. Science is both part and object of the game, 
the outcome of which depends on the force of each actor to shift the 
balance of power. 
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Notes 
1. Because several defense and space projects of the 1970s, as weil as the contracts 
for building nuclear-energy plants, will run out during the late 1980s, this complex 
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calls for follow-up orders visionary enough to allocate resources for at least ten 
or fifteen years (comparable to V.S. Star Wars). The chairman of the German 
Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft, Max Syrbe, referred to this point when he said: "The 
research capacities that became idle due to the decline of nuclear reactor technol-
ogy, are already budgeted for these projects [Hermes, Columbus, etc.]" (Bild der 
Wissenschaft, May 1986, p. 79). And the president of the German aerospace 
research organization (DFVLR), Hermann L. Jordan, proposed a simple measure: 
"redirection in the personnel sector: from nuclear technology to space flight" 
(Stellungnahmen, p. 9). (All German-English translations are by J. W.). 
2. Recent news confirms this: Foreign Minister Genscher has made himself a spokes-
man for German participation in manned space flight and the military use of space 
technologies (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung [hereafter, FAZ], 28 March 1987). 
The government increasingly seems to be adopting the plans of the space lobby, 
even though the terminology used in public is slightly more moderate. 
3. See Brauch 1984:34, and Weyer 1985. 
4. See Bild der Wissenschaft, 1968, p. 836. 
5. See Bild der Wissenschaft, 1971, pp. 691-697. 
6. See Bild der Wissenschaft, 1972, pp. 809-817. 
7. See, e.g., Anhörung, and Feuerbacher 1984:52. 
8. For details, see section IV, below. 
9. For details, see section UI, below. 
10. See also Daele, Krohn, and Weingart 1979b, and Hoch 1988. The concept "hybrid 
structures" was first used by Daele et al. (p. 27) in the context of R&D policy. 
Krohn further developed this idea and added the concept of a feedback mechan-
ism, thus going beyond classical concepts of unidirectional steering (see Krohn 
1981). 
11. Even if stimulated by military interests; see Wilkes 1978:5. 
12. Der Spiegel, February 1985, p. 79. 
13. See Der Spiegel, March 1984, pp. 61-62, and February 1985, p. 77. 
14. Bild der Wissenschaft, 1984, p. 54. 
15. See above. 
16. Which can hardly be justified, because the technologies used in space flight are 
usually those ofyesterday; see Keppler 1986:536, and Köhler 1984:51. 
17. Wehrtechnik, March 1987, p. 16. 
18. See below. 
19. Bild der Wissenschaft, May 1986, p. 145. 
20. See the scenarios in IABG 1986. 
21. Wehrtechnik, July 1986, p. 39. 
22. Ibid., p. 40. 
23. See Anhörung. Here again, the written opinion of the MBB representative Othmar 
Heise shows a more realistic viewpoint when he admits that positive effects of 
space research on economics cannot be proved (Stellungnalunen, p. 13). 
24. The first common NATO satellite was launched in 1970, nearly coincident with 
the first German civilian satellite; see Büdeler 1979:369. 
25. See below. 
26. DFVLR 1986, pp. 5/2, 6/2-4; see also Wehrtechnik,March 1987, p. 65. 
27. See Schreiber 1986. This article was published in Europa Archiv, which can be 
regarded as a semiofficial organ of the federal government. A short sampie: 
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"Thereby space research is of the highest importance in terms of security and 
power policy, because it corresponds to the conquest of the seas and of airspace in 
the past" (pp. 636-637). 
28. See also Dickson 1985:1244. 
29. This shift can easily be shown by looking at the technical outfit of the Ariane 
family: 
Model Payload Orbit Comments 
Ariane I 1,780 kg GTO production ends 1988/99 
ArianeII 2,177 kg GTO further devel. of A I 
ArianeIII 2,580 kg GTO further devel. of A I 
Ariane IV ca. 4,500kg GTO further devel. of A III; 1st flight planed 
1986/87 
Ariane V 5,200kg GTO new devel., for the 1990s 
or 15,000 kg LEO 
(Data from Bild der Wissenschaft, February 1986, p. 50; FAZ, 28 May 1986.) 
If we assurne (a point I cannot discuss here at length) that the geo-orbit is primarily 
interesting for commercial users, while the low orbit can contribute very little to 
commercial, scientific, and probably economic concerns, and if we further take 
into consideration that the heaviest communications satellites ever built weighed 
about 2,000 kg, while military satellites weigh 12,000 kg or more, we can easily 
see that the new technological system the Europeans have decided to construct, 
Ariane V, has only little use for actual commercial or scientific purposes, but much 
more for military interests and/or for manned space flight by carrying the shuttle 
Hermes or elements of aspace station into low orbit. 
30. l'his example of European space projects also shows the enormous se1f-dynamics 
thai a program of this kind can gain. When the German government decided in 
January 1985 to participate in the Ariane V program and the Columbus program, 
but refused at the same time to do any other projects, everyone knew - and the 
space lobby used this argument with vehemence during the parliamentary hearing 
(see Anhörung, pp. 111, 165) - that the space pro gram only makes sense if it is 
completed by the missing link: a shuttle, launched by Ariane to transport materials 
and astronauts to Columbus. So predecisions were made that produced irrever-
sibilities and constraints to continue on the preestablished path. 
31. A new launching plant, a set of satellites, and other details had to be added; see 
DFVLR 1986, and Johanson 1987. 
32. FAZ, 25 August 1986; DGAP 1986:55-56. 
33. Fricke, in Stellungnahmen, p. 11. 
34. Here even ignoring the German plans for a futuristic shuttle called Saenger, to be 
deve10ped during the construction period of Hermes. 
35. See FAZ, 21 June 1986. 
36. As the FAZ (20 June 1986) does it. 
37. The case of the discussion about a military version of the German Airbus-plane, 
carefully launched in 1986, shows the way this mechanism works, or starts to 
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work, especially in a situation of economic crisis and unemployment. 
38. Bild der Wissenschaft, May 1986, p. 146. 
39. Heise, in Stellungnahmen, pp. 8,14. 
40. Heise, ibid., p. 19; Hartbaum, ibid., p. 6. 
41. See, e.g., Riesenhuber, in "Das Parlament," p. 3. 
42. FAZ, 17 December 1986. 
43. Schmidt, in Stellungnahmen, p. 3. 
44. Heise, ibid., pp. 17-18; for more details, see Fuchs 1986. 
45. "Das Parlament," p. 12. 
46. Ibid. 
47. The notion "shelterbelt" has been borrowed from Lakatos (1974) - not in a strict 
interpretation, but in an analog transfer. 
48. If we look at the history of space flight, this suspicion is very quickly confirmed; 
see Brauch 1984, and Büdeler 1968. 
49. See FAZ, 4 August 1986. 
50. In Spektrum der Wissenschaft, March 1986. 
51. This sector is even so profitable that government can, after having paid enormous 
costs for R&D, withdraw from this field, leaving the profit-collecting to the 
industries. 
52. See Anhörung, and FAZ, 4 August 1986. 
53. I refer to the recent research of Wolfgang Krohn and Günter Küppers; see Krohn 
1985, Krohn 1986, Krohn and Küppers 1987, and Küppers and Paslack 1986. 
54. In R&D policy a similar externalization can be discovered, if we look at the step-
by-step replacement of the definitions of social problems (such as health, work, 
ecology) by external problems (such as world market, foreign policy, conquering 
the deep seas or outer space). 
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